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STATUTES AND RULES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
TO THE APPEAL 
42U.S.C. §1983. 
Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any 
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of 
the United State or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress, except that in any 
action brought against a judicial officer for any act 
or omission taken in such officer's judicial 
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted 
unless a declaratory decree was violated or 
declaratory relief was unavailable. For the 
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress 
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia 
shall be considered to be a statue of the District of 
Columbia. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(e). 
When a motion for summary judgment is made 
and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse 
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, 
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against him. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASK 
NATURE OF THE CASE. This is a claim against Midvale City, 
and two of its employees, for the failure to hire the Plaintiff as a police 
officer. The Plaintiff applied for a job with Midvale City. He was 
interviewed by a panel which included the Defendants Tim Start and Tony 
Mason. Tim Start told Tony Mason and the other interview panel members 
that he believed that the Plaintiff had been forced to leave his previous 
employment. Tim Start and Tony Mason gave the Plaintiff low marks on his 
interview response to the question about why he had left his previous 
employment because the Plaintiff answered that he had voluntarily resigned 
that employment. 
After the City chose not to hire the Plaintiff he sued the City, Tim 
Start and Tony Mason alleging several state tort claims and a claim under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. The Defendants filed a motion 
for summary judgment on June 11th 2004. (Record pgs.67-68). On July 2, 
2004 the Plaintiff's attorney requested an extension of time to respond to the 
motion for one week, which was granted by the Defendants' counsel. 
(Record pg. 221). When the extension expired without the Plaintiff having 
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filed any memorandum in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, 
the Defendants requested, on July 21, 2004, that the District Court rule on 
the Motion. (Record pgs. 133-134). The Court ruled on the motion on 
August 10, 2004. (Record pgs 189-191, District Court's Minute entry, 
Appellees' Addendum). The Plaintiff had filed a responsive memorandum 
on August 5,2004 which was not considered by the Court when it rendered 
its decision on the Motion for Summary Judgment, because it was untimely. 
The District Court judge dismissed all claims on the Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the judgment and 
alleged newly discovered evidence. The District Court denied that motion. 
The Plaintiff appealed the decisions of the District Court but has 
only briefed the issues regarding the dismissal of the claims for deprivation 
of his federal constitutional rights made under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The 
Plaintiff apparently has accepted the District Court's ruling on the state tort 
claims. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
' ' ' ' ' " \ ' 
The following facts are the only material facts that should be 
considered in this Appeal because they were established by the Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment, and were not properly placed in dispute by 
the Plaintiff: 
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1. Midvale City is a political subdivision of the State of Utah. (Record 
Pg- 70). 
2. The Defendant Tim Start was an employee of Midvale City. (Record 
Pg- 70). 
3. Tony Mason was an employee with Midvale City. (Record pg.70) 
4. Plaintiff applied for position with Midvale City as a police officer. 
(Record pg.70). 
5. Prior to applying for work with Midvale City, the Plaintiff had been 
employed with the Jordan School District as a police officer. (Record 
pg, 70). 
6. As part of the application process with Midvale City, the Plaintiff 
was scheduled for oral interview with a board of four members. 
(Record pg.70). 
7. Two of the four members of the interview board were the Defendants 
Tim Start and Tony Mason. (Record pg.70). 
8. Prior to the interview Tim Start was told by his Assistant Police Chief 
that the Chief of the Jordan School District Police force had said that 
the happiest day of his life was when the chief was able to take the 
Plaintiff, Greg Chase, home. (Record pg. 70). 
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9. Tim Start interpreted this statement to mean that the Plaintiff's 
employment with Jordan School District had been involuntarily 
terminated. (Record pg. 71). 
10. Tim Start told Tony Mason that the Plaintiff's employment with 
Jordan School District had been involuntarily terminated. (Record 
Pg-71). 
11. The only evidence that Plaintiff had, that either Tim Start or Tony 
Mason knew, or should have known, that it was false that Plaintiff's 
employment with Jordan School District had been involuntarily 
terminated, was the Plaintiff's application for employment with 
Midvale City and the Plaintiff's answers to the interview questions. 
(Record pg.71). 
12. During the interview process the Plaintiff was asked a question 
concerning why he had left his previous job and he answered that he 
had voluntarily resigned. (Record pg.71). 
13. The Plaintiff was not hired by Midvale City and was ranked 
somewhere between 12 andl4 on the potential candidate list. (Record 
Pg- 71). 
14. The Plaintiff does not know of anybody, other than Tony Mason and 
the members of the interview panel, who was told by either Tim Start 
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or Tony Mason told that Plaintiffs employment with Jordan School 
District had been involuntarily terminated. (Record pg. 71). 
15. Both Tim Start and Tony Mason gave Plaintiff zero points for his 
answer in the interview about why he had left his previous jobs. 
(Record pg.71). 
16. The Plaintiff had applied for unemployment benefits with the State 
of Utah and in his application for unemployment benefits had 
indicated that he had been forced to resign his previous job with the 
Jordan School District. (Record pg. 71.) 
17. The Plaintiff does not know of any potential employers who have 
been told by the Defendants that the Plaintiff lied about why he left 
his employment with the Jordan School District. (Record pg.72). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There were no material facts in dispute that prevented the District 
Court from granting the Defendant's motion for summary judgment because 
the Plaintiff failed to timely respond to the Defendants' motion and when he 
finally did respond he did not controvert the Statement of Facts in the 
Defendants' memorandum in support of summary judgment. 
Based upon the undisputed facts before the District Court the 
Plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fail as a matter of law. The claim 
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of deprivation of liberty without due process of law fails because there is no 
factual allegation that the Plaintiff's reputation was damaged, by these 
Defendants, in conjunction with the termination of his employment and there 
is no evidence that the Defendants harmed the Plaintiff's reputation in such a 
manner as to foreclose other employment opportunities for the Plaintiff. 
The Plaintiff's equal protection claim fails because he failed to 
identify any particular class or group that he belongs to that was subjected to 
disparate treatment by the Defendants, or to present to the District Court, 
any evidence of disparate treatment based on personal animus toward him by 
the Defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THERE WERE NO FACTS IN DISPUTE WHICH PREVENTED THE 
DISTRICT COURT FROM DECIDING THIS MATTER ON A 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 (e), provided that "[w]hen 
a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this 
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
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trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against him." 
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Anderson Development Co. v. 
Tobias, 2005 Ut 36, P.3d (2005): 
To successfully defend against a motion for 
summary judgment, the nonmoving party must set 
forth facts "sufficient to establish the existence of 
an element essential to that party's case." Burns v. 
Cannondale Bicycle Co.. 876 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett 
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Failure to do so with 
regard to any of the essential elements of that 
party's claim will result in a conclusion that the 
moving party "is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law." Id- at 420; see also Celotex. 477 U.S. at 
322-23 ("In such a situation, there can be 'no 
genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a 
complete failure of proof concerning an essential 
element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily 
renders all other facts immaterial." (quoting Fed. 
R. Civ. P.56 (c)). Anderson Development Co. v. 
Tobias, atf 23. 
Because the Plaintiff failed to properly and timely respond to the 
motion for summary judgment the facts set forth in this Brief are the relevant 
facts of this case. Based upon these facts the Defendants were entitled to 
summary judgment on all claims in the complaint. No other facts should be 
considered in this Appeal and the Plaintiff should not now be allowed to 
submit additional facts to attempt to create issues of fact. 
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POINT TWO 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S RULE 59 
MOTION TO AMEND THE JUDGMENT PURSUANT WAS 
PROPER 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a district court's order granting 
or denying Rule 59 motion for a new trial or to amend a judgment should not 
be reversed unless there has been a manifest abuse of discretion. Doty v. 
Town of Cedar Hills. 656 P. 2d 993 (1982). The PlaintifPs Brief in this case 
has not presented any facts or argument that the District Court abused its 
discretion in denying the motion to amend the judgment. That order of the 
District Court should not be reversed. 
POINT THREE 
THE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM 
UNDER 42 U.S.C. $ 1983 UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely 
provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred by federal statute 
or the Constitution. Albright v. Oliver. 510 U.S. 266,271 (1994). "The first 
inquiry in any 1983 suit. . . is whether the Plaintiff has been deprived of a 
right 'secured by the Constitution and laws' [ ;] . . . it is necessary to isolate 
the precise constitutional violation with which he is charged." Baker v. 
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McCollan. 443 U.S. 137,140 (1979). Unless Plaintiff has clearly pled and 
can prove a violation of federal constitutional rights there can be no section 
1983 claim. 
The Plaintiff identified in his complaint three distinct federal 
Constitutional provisions for his section 1983 claim. (See Complaint 
attached in Appellee's Addendum). He alleged a deprivation of property 
without due process of law (Record pg.13), a deprivation of liberty without 
due process of law (Record pg. 12) and a denial of equal protection of the 
law. (Record pg. 13-14). Since he did not brief the deprivation of property 
claim he apparently is only appealing the District Court Judge's decision 
regarding the liberty interest and equal protection and conceding on the 
claim regarding the deprivation of a property interest. 
For Midvale City to be liable to the Plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. §1983 
there must be a local government official policy or custom, which is a cause 
in fact of the Plaintiff's constitutional deprivation. Monell v. Department of 
Social Services. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Municipal liability cannot be based 
on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Midvale City can only be held liable 
for its own actions and not for the actions of its officers and employees. 
The Plaintiff's Complaint does not identify any policy, practice, 
custom or procedures of Midvale City that he believes deprived him of his 
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constitutional rights, nor does the Plaintiff's Brief on Appeal. This alone 
was sufficient to allow the District Court Judge to dismiss the claims against 
Midvale City. 
The section 1983 claims against the individually named defendants 
also fail as a matter of law and summary judgment was appropriate. While 
the Plaintiff may have pled a state tort claim of defamation against the 
individual defendants, all state law tort claims were dismissed by the District 
Court based on the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (record pgs.189,198) 
and that dismissal has not been appealed by the Plaintiff. 
There is no federal constitutional claim for defamation. However, in 
Paul v. Davis. 424 U.S. 693,708-10 (1976) the United States Supreme Court 
held that a state may abridge a person's liberty interest by creating a stigma 
or other disability that foreclosed an employee's freedom to take advantage 
of other employment opportunities. The Supreme Court stated that 
defamation, standing alone, is not sufficient to establish a claim for 
deprivation of a liberty interest. "[T]he defamation had to occur in the course 
of the termination of employment." Id. at 710. 
The United States Supreme Court has further stated that no 
constitutional claim can be stated even where a Defendant acts with malice 
in defaming another and that a government employee could not have a 
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liberty interest claiih if the alleged defamation did not occur in connection 
with the termination of his government employment. Siegert v. Gillev. 500 
U. S. 226,234 (1991). 
In the case of Stidham v. Peace Officer Standards and Training, 265 
F.3d 1144, (10th Cir. 2001) the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held, in 
reliance on Siegert. that a claimant who had resigned employment and could 
not obtain employment elsewhere, allegedly due to defamatory statements, 
did not have a liberty interest claim. 
This is similar to the case before this court. There are no allegations 
in the complaint, or facts in the record, that indicate that the actions of any of 
the Defendants foreclosed any employment opportunities with anyone other 
than Midvale City. 
To prove his liberty interest claim the Plaintiff must be able to show 
that the Defendants defamed him, and that this defamation was in 
conjunction with the termination of his government employment. 
The undisputed facts in this case do not show either of these elements. 
The facts are that the Defendant Tim Start believed that the Plaintiff had 
been forced to resign for the Jordan School District. (Record pgs.70,71); 
that he communicated that belief to the members of the interview panel, 
(Record pgs. 70, 71); that the Plaintiff when asked about why he had left his 
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employment with Jordan School District replied that he had voluntarily 
resigned (Record pg. 71); the Defendants Tim Start and Tony Mason gave 
him low marks on his interview because of this answer (Record pg. 71); 
because of these low marks he ranked between 12th and 14th on the Midvale 
City hiring list (Record pg. 71); that the Defendants did not tell anyone else 
including other potential employers of the Plaintiff that the Plaintiff had 
been forced to resign his employment with the Jordan School District. 
(Record pgs.71,72). 
There are no facts in the record that establish that the Defendants 
harmed the Plaintiff's reputation in any way. There is also no allegation that 
the Defendants participated in anyway in the termination of Plaintiff's 
employment with the Jordan School District. 
The Plaintiff has argued that he has a liberty interest claim because the 
defendants Tim Start and Tony Mason wrongfully kept him from being 
employed by Midvale City. The Plaintiff has not cited any law or authority 
for this proposition. 
The section 1983 claim based on an alleged denial of equal protection 
of the law also fails as a matter of law. The Plaintiff has not alleged 
membership in any particular group. He has alleged that was singled out for 
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disparate treatment by the Defendants denying him an equal opportunity to 
"compete for the position of police officer." (Record pg. 14). 
Federal constitutional law does recognize the possibility of equal 
protection claims based on a class of one. See Village of Willowbrook v. 
Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000). This appears to be what the Plaintiff is alleging. 
However, to succeed with an Olech claim, the Utah Supreme Court has held 
that a Plaintiff must present evidence that the Defendant deliberately sought 
to deprive the Plaintiff of the equal protection of the laws for reasons of a 
personal nature unrelated to the duties of the Defendant's position. It 
requires a showing of animus toward Plaintiffs by the Defendants. Patterson 
v. American Fork. 2003 UT 7, 67 P3d 466. at |33. 
The Complaint does not contain any allegations of personal animus by 
the Defendants toward the Plaintiff nor does it have any allegation that any 
individual acted against the Plaintiff outside of that individual Defendant's 
duties. The Plaintiff's equal protection claim must fail as a matter of law 
even if all of the factual allegations of the Complaint were considered to be 
true. 
The Plaintiff's Brief on Appeal attempts to argue a claim under the 
Utah Constitution for violation of his rights under the uniform operation of 
laws provisions of the Utah Constitution. However, the Complaint filed in 
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this matter does not contain a claim under the Utah uniform operation of 
laws provisions of the Utah Constitution but only an equal protection claim 
under the United States Constitution. This claim should therefore not be 
considered. 
In addition a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be based on a 
violation of a state constitutional right. It is a remedy for violations of 
federal rights only. However, even if a section 1983 claim could be based 
on the Utah Constitution, and the Plaintiff had pled such a claim in his 
complaint, this claim would fail under the facts in this case. 
In evaluating a uniform operation of laws claim this Court must first 
determine what classifications if any are created by a Midvale City policy or 
ordinance. Second, this Court must determine whether different classes or 
subclasses are treated disparately. Finally, if any disparate treatment exists 
the court must determine whether the City had any reasonable objective that 
justified the disparity. See State v. Moht 901 P.2d 991 at 997 (Utah 1995). 
The Plaintiff has not identified any particular Midvale City policy or 
ordinance that creates classes or subclasses to which he belongs. He is only 
arguing that he was treated differently than other apphcants for employment. 
This is not sufficient for a claim under the uniform operation of laws 
provision of the Utah Constitution. 
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CONCLUSION 
The District Court was correct in granting summary judgment on all 
of Plaintiff's claims. The Plaintiff did not respond timely to the motion for 
summary judgment and therefore the facts in the motion by the Defendants 
were undisputed. Based upon these undisputed facts the Plaintiff's section 
1983 claims failed as a matter of law. The District Court did not err in 
denying the Plaintiff motion to amend the judgment and allow additional 
discovery. 
Dated this 12 *L < day of 
David L. Church 
Attorney for Defendants/ Appellees 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned certifies that true and correct copied of the foregoing 
Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, this /"X^day of \Ji^^~A^. 2005 
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D.Bruce Oliver #5120 
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Attorney for Gregory K. Chase 
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ADDENDUM 
20 
COMPLAINT 
DAVID J. HOLDSWORTH (4052) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
9125 South Monroe Plaza Way, Suite C 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Telephone (801) 352-7701 
Facsimile (801) 567-9960 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GREGORY K.CHASE, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MIDVALE CITY, a political 
subdivision of the State of Utah, 
MIDVALE CITY POLICE 
DEPARTMENT, a department of 
Midvale City, and TIM START, and 
TONY MASON, individuals, 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Gregory K. Chase, demands trial by jury, 
complains of Midvale City, Midvale City Police Department (hereinafter collectively 
referred to as "Midvale City"), and Tim Start and Tony Mason, and for causes of action 
alleges as follows: 
JURISDICTION - PARTIES 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No, &'$Of<0<Tf&G 
Honorable "7*"^  ' A/p^o^^ 
1. Plaintiff, Gregory K. Chase, is a male person, a citizen of the 
United States and at all times relevant hereto was a resident of the State of Utah and 
City of Midvale, who lives at 8344 S. Monroe Street, Midvale, UT 84047. 
2. Midvale City is a political subdivision of the State of Utah. 
3. Midvale City Police Department is a Department of Midvale City 
government. 
4. Tim Start is an individual who is employed with Midvale City and 
the Midvale City Police Department. 
5. Tony Mason is an individual who is employed with Midvale City 
and the Midvale City Police Department. 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
6. On October 31, 2002, pursuant to Utah Code § 63-30-11, Mr. 
Chase served a Notice of Claim on the City Recorder of Midvale City. Such Notice of 
Claim complied with § 63-30-11. Such Notice of Claim was timely filed under § 63-
30-13. 
7. Midvale City did not respond to such Notice of Claim within the 
time specified in § 63-30-14. Accordingly, such claim is deemed denied. 
8. This Court has jurisdiction of this case under § 63-30-16. 
BACKGROUND FACTS 
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9. In approximately April 2002, Mr. Chase voluntarily resigned from 
his employment with Jordan School District. 
10. In June 2002, Mr. Chase applied for a position with Midvale City 
and the Midvale City Police Department as a police officer. He passed the "B-Pad" 
written examination, and shortly thereafter, he was scheduled for an oral interview with 
a Board of four members. 
11. Mr. Chase went in for his oral interview with the Board feeling 
optimistic about his chances for hire, as he has been in law enforcement for nineteen 
(19) years and he knew most of the officers in the Midvale City Police Department. He 
has also lived in Midvale City for almost the same amount of years. 
12. When Mr. Chase went into the room for the oral interview, he felt 
comfortable and confident, as he knew all four (4) of the individuals on the Board. As 
each member asked Mr. Chase questions, he answered each question openly and 
honestly. As he left, he felt as though he had done a really good interview. 
13. After having not heard anything back from Midvale City in the 
following almost three (3) weeks, Mr. Chase contacted one of the individuals on the 
Oral Board, Brian Todd. This individual advised Mr. Chase that Mr. Chase had ended 
up being ranked somewhere around 12th to 14th on the hire list. At first, Mr. Chase 
thought Mr. Todd was just joking with him. Then, after a few minutes, Mr. Chase 
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realized that Mr. Todd was serious. Mr. Chase asked, nhow could this be?" Mr. Todd 
explained that one of the individuals on the Oral Board, Tim Start, had told the others 
on the Oral Board before Mr. Chase even walked into the interview room that: (1) Mr. 
Chase was lying about why he had left his previous employer, that Mr. Start told the 
others in the room that he had it on good source-that someone from Mr. Chase's 
previous employer had told him that Mr. Chase had been fired-that Mr. Chase had not 
quit; and (2) Mr. Start also stated that someone from Mr. Chase's previous employer 
had told him that Mr. Chase had been called in by his Chief one day, told to turn in all 
his equipment and gear, and driven home by the Chief. Tim Start stated that because of 
such things, Mr. Chase must be lying about his previous employment history and, 
therefore, he was going to fail Mr. Chase on the oral interview. Tim Start, along with 
another individual on the Board, Tony Mason, both failed Mr. Chase on question # 4). 
Tell us about your employment history for the past 5 years, and question # 4a. Why did 
you leave those jobs? Both of those individuals gave Mr. Chase zero (0) points for his 
answer (which, by the way, Mr. Chase answered honestly and correctly). 
14. Mr. Todd, the officer who advised Mr. Chase of what had 
happened before the Oral Board interview, also told Mr. Chase that he should contact 
the Midvale City Chief of Police and let him know of what happened. That same exact 
day Mr. Chase did try to contact the Chief to lodge a protest, but only got his answering 
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machine. The next day, one of the individuals on the Oral Board, and one who had 
failed Mr. Chase based on Mr. Start's false information, Tony Mason, contacted Mr. 
Chase. This individual (Tony Mason) advised Mr. Chase that the Chief would not 
entertain any meeting or conversation in regards to this incident. Mr. Chase brought up 
what he knew about what had happened before the Oral Board convened with him, and 
Mr. Mason told Mr. Chase that he didn't have a clue about what Mr. Chase was talking 
about. 
15. Thereafter, Mr. Chase re-contacted Brian Todd, the officer who 
had advised Mr. Chase of what had occurred, and Mr. Todd once again told Mr. Chase 
how Mr. Start had stated that he was told from Mr. Chase's previous employer that Mr. 
Chase had been fired and that Mr. Chase was lying to them about his quitting his 
previous employer. Mr. Chase told Mr. Todd again that he had not been fired, that he 
had resigned. Mr. Chase even stated that he would show the Board a copy of his letter 
of resignation, and the letter from his former Chief, Clyde Shaw, who stated Mr. Chase 
left in good standing. Mr. Chase even offered to show them the decision from an 
unemployment judge. (At the time, Mr. Chase was attempting to get unemployment 
insurance benefits, and Judge Patterson had denied his eligibility because Mr. Chase 
had quit.) 
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16. Mr. Todd told Mr. Chase he had confronted Tim Start and Tony 
Mason about their comments before Mr. Chase's interview with the Board; telling them 
that he personally had spoken to Mr. Chase, and that Mr. Chase had told him about Mr. 
Chase's quitting his last job. He also told Mr. Start and Mr. Mason that he would 
personally like the opportunity to verify everything Mr. Chase had been telling him 
through performing a background check on Mr. Chase. Mr. Start and Mr. Mason told 
Mr. Todd that that would not be necessary, that they were sure Mr. Chase had been 
fired, and that Mr. Chase had lied to the Board. 
17. Mr. Chase couldn't understand how someone who had as much 
experience as he had, who had done so much for the State of Utah, could be blacklisted 
based on false information. Mr. Chase had been involved in many important 
events/cases in the State's history over the last almost 20 years. He had worked on the 
Unsolved Homicide Task Force, the Original Gang (Operation Red Flag) Task Force, 
The Mark Hoffmann (Mormon Murder Investigation), The Ervil Lebaron Task Force; 
he was an original member of the FBI's Fugitive/Violent Crimes Task Force. Mr. 
Chase could not believe how someone with this much background was now not even 
able to get an fair interview. 
18. Mr. Chase then contacted Attorney Shawn Robinson, and 
explained what was going on. Mr. Chase told Mr. Robinson that within days of being 
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told he could not talk to the Midvale City Chief of Police, he received a letter from 
Tony Mason , one of the individuals who had failed him, stating that all information in 
regard to Mr. Chase's testing and oral interview was going to be destroyed within a few 
days. Attorney Robinson subpoenaed the information on the testing results, which 
showed exactly what Mr. Chase had already been told, that he had been failed on that 
particular question by Tim Start and Tony Mason. (#4, 4a). 
19. During the next week or so, Mr. Chsae contacted City Councilman 
Wayne Sharp, and told him about what had happened, and about how Mr.Chase knew 
the Board had not handled this situation properly. Mr. Sharp advised Mr. Chase that he 
would look into the matter. Within a week, Mr. Chase received a phone call from Mr. 
Mason, indicating that he wanted Mr. Chase to come in for a talk. Mr. Chase figured 
that maybe at this point he would get what he had been asking for: an apology, and the 
name of the person from my previous employer who had published false information. 
Instead, all Mr. Mason wanted to talk about was the other person on the Oral Board 
(Brian Todd) who had told Mr. Chase about what had happened. Mr. Mason wanted a 
statement from Mr. Chase about what Mr. Todd had told Mr. Chase. Mr. Chase refused 
to give this information to him. Mr. Chase asked Mr. Mason directly for the name of 
the person from his previous employer who had said these things about him. Mr. 
Mason would not respond. Mr. Mason asked if Mr. Chase would sign a waiver 
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allowing the Board to get Mr. Chase's personnel records from his previous employer to 
see under what circumstances Mr. Chase did leave. Mr. Chase agreed and signed the 
waiver. As Mr. Chase was leaving, Mr. Mason stated, "If it's like your saying, maybe 
you can test again and, then, next time you'll get a fair interview!11 Mr. Chase left even 
more frustrated. 
20. Next, Mr. Chase had a meeting with the Midvale City 
Administrator, Lee King. Mr. Chase told Mr. King that he was aware of the problems 
Brian Todd was now experiencing because he had spoken to Mr. Chase regarding what 
had happened during the Oral Board. Mr. Todd had been told he was going to be 
written up, not allowed to be on the Oral Board anymore and that he could even 
possibly be terminated. Mr. Chase told Mr. King they were harassing the wrong 
person, that they should be looking into the actions of Tim Start and Tony Mason, who 
had slandered him, who actually violated City Policies and Procedures, and taken away 
Mr. Chase's right to work within his career. Instead, they were going after the honest 
and ethical person. Mr. King told Mr. Chase that he had spoken to Tony Mason and 
Mr. Mason stated, "that what was said before Mr. Chase's interview, didn't really have 
any effect on how they scored him." (An admission that it had actually occurred.) Mr. 
Chase asked Mr. King how Mr. Start and Mr. Mason knew it had no effect? Mr. King 
had no answer. Mr. Chase told Mr. King that all Mr. Chase wanted at the time was the 
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name of the person from his previous employer who distributed the false information to 
Mr. Start and Mr. Mason. 
21. Subsequently, Mr. Chase learned that Brian Todd had several 
meetings with regard to this situation. Mr. Todd had one meeting with Tony Mason, 
the superior officer who failed Mr. Chase on the oral interviews and one with the Lee 
King, the City Administrator. Mr. Chase is aware of what came out of those meetings, 
and aware of the evidence that proves that what Mr. Todd told Mr. Chase did occure 
did in fact occur, and the actions of those covering this up. 
22. After speaking to Lee King, Mr. Chase left several messages for 
the Mayor of Midvale City, JoAnn Seghrist, to contact Mr. Chase but has received no 
reply. 
DEFAMATION 
23. The actions set forth above in fflf 9 through 22 constitute the tort 
of defamation in that (1) one of the members of the panel of the Oral Board published 
to other members of the Oral Board; (2) statements which were false, which the 
publisher either knew to be false or knew that he didn't know whether it was true or 
false (recklessly)-namely, that Mr. Chase had been fired from his previous employment 
with Jordan School District and, therefore, that he was lying on his application and 
efforts to obtain employment with Midvale City. . 
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24. Such statements were defamatory, defamatory per se and have 
caused Mr. Chase to suffer injury and loss in that he was not able to advance beyond 
the interview stage in his effort to be selected for one of the vacancies at issue. 
INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC INTERESTS 
25. The actions set forth above in fflf 9 throughly constitute the 
wrongful and tortuous conduct of "interference with prospective economic interest" in 
that (1) members of the Oral Board knew of the presence of an expectancy on the part 
of Mr. Chase of entering into a contractual relationship for employment with Midvale 
City; (2) such individuals published said information to the other members of the Oral 
Board and acted on the basis of such information in their ranking of Mr. Chase with 
the intent and for the purpose of interfering in Mr. Chase's pending and prospective 
economic relations with Midvale City and with the intent and for the purpose of 
preventing Mr. Chase from securing employment opportunities and employment with 
Midvale City without justification; (3) published or caused to be published information 
about Mr. Chase which was false; (4) which persuaded the Board to not allow Mr. 
Chase to proceed beyond the interview stage, to Mr. Chase's detriment and damage; 
and (5) such action was undertaken to pursue personal goals or to intentionally harm 
Mr. Chase and in detriment to Midvale City's best interests. 
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26. The person(s) who passed false information on about Mr. Chase 
interfered with Mr. Chase's ability to compete fairly and obtain employment with 
Midvale City. 
27. Such actions, as set forth above, constitute interference with an 
improper purpose and by an improper means as prohibited by various public policies of 
the State of Utah, such as the Utah Constitution, Article XVI, the Utah Criminal Code 
76-9-501 to 509, Utah Code 34-24-1, et. seq. and not diminished by the Utah Employer 
Reference Immunity Act, Utah Code 34-42-1. 
28. Such actions have caused Mr. Chase to suffer injury and loss in 
that he was not able to advance beyond the interview state in his efforts to be selected 
for one of the vacancies at issue. 
VIOLATION OF CITY AND DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES 
29. Mr. Chase alleges the actionsset forth in fflf r/ through <££ a^asa. 
violated various City and Departmental policies that the City agreed to comply with 
when he submitted an application for employment. 
30. Mr. Chase has earned and deserves the right to be allowed to apply 
for and compete for employment with Midvale City without having member(s) of the 
interview panel publish information about him which was false to other members of the 
panel before the interview. 
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31. Mr. Chase believes the City policy on filling vacancies mandates 
that any background check is performed only after the interview stage of the process, 
not before. 
32. As set forth above, Mr. Start and Mr. Mason received false 
information about Mr. Chase and published the same to other members of the Oral 
Board before the oral interviews and acted on the basis of such false information. 
33. Such actions have caused Mr. Chase to suffer injury and loss in 
that he was not able to advance beyond the interview state in his efforts to be selected 
for one of the vacancies at issue. 
DEPRIVATION OF A LIBERTY INTEREST 
34. Mr. Chase has a liberty interest in the ability to compete equally 
and fairly for vacancies within Midvale City and to pursue his career in law 
enforcement. 
35. The sources of such liberty interest are found in Midvale City 
Departmental Personnel Policies and Procedures and policies and procedures that 
relate to selection of candidates for hire. 
36. The actions set forth above in fflf / through constitute the 
wrongful deprivation of such a liberty interest without due process of law in violation 
of42U.S.C. § 1983. 
12 
37. Such actions have caused Mr. Chase to suffer injury and loss in 
that he was not able to advance beyond the interview state in his efforts to be selected 
for one of the vacancies at issue. 
DEPRIVATION OF A PROPERTY INTEREST 
38. Mr. Chase has a property interest in the ability to compete equally 
and fairly for vacancies within Midvale City and to receive an honest and fair 
evaluation for employment and to not have slander destroy his chance to interview for 
and obtain a job and provide for himself and his family. 
39. The sources of such property right are found in Midvale City and 
Departmental Personnel Polices and Procedures and policies and procedures that relate 
to selection of candidates for hire. 
40. The actions set forth above in ^ / through ^j? constitute the 
wrongful deprivation of such a property interest without due process of law in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
41. Such actions have caused Mr. Chase to suffer injury and loss in 
that he was not able to advance beyond the interview state in his efforts to be selected 
for one of the vacancies at issue. 
DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION 
13 
42. The 14th Amendment guarantees to citizens the equal protection of 
the law. 
43. Mr. Chase believes and contends that Mr. Tim Start and Mr. Tony 
Mason communicated information regarding Mr. Chase's work history, character and 
reputation, which was false to other Midvale City employees prior to the oral interview 
and otherwise interfered and deprived Mr. Chase an equal opportunity to compete for 
the position of police officer. 
44. Mr. Chase contends the reasons provided for the rejection of his 
application are false, are a pretext to mask denial of equal opportunities and cannot be 
substantiated by the Defendants. 
45. Mr. Chase contends the actions set forth above in lfl[ / through 
77 deprived him of an equal opportunity to compete for job openings announced and 
recruited for by Midvale City in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
46. Such actions have caused Mr. Chase to suffer injury and loss in 
that he was not able to advance beyond the interview state in his efforts to be selected 
for one of the vacancies at issue. 
DAMAGES 
47. Defendants' wrongful actions as set forth above have caused Mr. 
Chase to experience and suffer the loss of the opportunity to compete, to be selected 
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and hired, to earn wages and benefits and have caused him embarrassment, 
humiliation, emotional pain and distress for which he makes a claim to compensation. 
48. If Mr. Chase had been given a fair interview, he would have been 
hired on or about July 1, 2002. If he had been hired by the Midvale City Police 
Department, Mr. Chase figures he would have been hired at, or close to, what he was 
already making when he quit his former employer of $19.92 per/hour. Mr. Chase is 
aware that Midvale has hired many other officers with years of experience from other 
agencies, and is crediting them on a year-for-year experience basis and paying them 
accordingly. In addition, Mr. Chase contends that if he had been hired, he would have 
been entitled to participate in and receive all the other benefits that Midvale City 
provides its police officers. 
49. Since the events set forth above have occurred, Mr. Chase has had 
to change his entire way of life. He doesn't sleep through the nights, he feels an 
enormous amount of stress, pressure, and the constant worry for his family. He 
wonders if he'll ever be allowed to finish up his last year or two or law enforcement so 
as to be able to receive a public safety retirement. The effect of these circumstances on 
Mr. Chase has caused a tremendous strain on him and his family. 
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50. As a result of the actions, events and decision set forth above, Mr. 
Chase also had to hire legal counsel and incur fees and costs. Mr. Chase makes a claim 
for such additional fees and costs. 
WHEREFORE, Mr. Chase prays for judgment against Defendants as 
follows for sums and other relief as may reasonably compensate him for the torts and 
wrongful actions described above, to wit: 
1. Compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at trial; 
2. For costs of this action; 
3. For reasonable attorney' s fees; 
4. For such other relief as the Court deems suitable and proper. 
DATED THIS / / d a y of March, 2003. 
David J. Holds worth 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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VERIFICATION 
Gregory K. Chase, being first duly sworn, upon his oath, deposes and 
says that he is the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action, that he has read the foregoing 
COMPLAINT and understands the contents thereof, and the allegations made therein 
are true of his own knowledge, except as to those matters alleged on information and 
belief which he believes to be true. 
Gregory K£jChase 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, a Notary Public, this 
day of March, 2003. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: RESIDING AT: 
DISTRICT COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MINUTE ENTRY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GREGORY K. CHASE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MIDVALE CITY, a political 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah, MIDVALE CITY POLICE 
DEPARTMENT, A DEPARTMENT OF 
MIDVALE CITY, and TIM START, 
and TONY MASON, individuals, 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 030905866 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
AUG t fl 2004 
ALT LAKE COUNTY 
By 
Oepuu Clerk 
The Court has before it a request for decision filed by the 
defendants seeking a ruling on their Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Court notes that the plaintiff has not responded to the Motion 
and the time for doing so has now expired. Therefore, having 
reviewed the Motion and no opposition having been filed, the Court 
determines that the Motion is well-taken and therefore granted. 
Specifically, it appears that the majority of the plaintiff's 
claims fall under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, thereby 
shielding the defendants from liability. Further, as a result of 
the plaintiff's failure to respond, it is uncontroverted that the 
plaintiff's federal constitutional claims have no legal substance 
and fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court grants the 
/2f 
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defendants' Motion for the reasons advanced in the defendants' 
moving papers. 
Counsel for the defendants is to prepare an Order consistent 
with this Minute Entry decision. The trial date of August 31, 
2004, is stricken. 
Dated this ( w day of August, 2004. 
/*? 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
As a postscript to this Minute Entry decision, the Court notes 
since dictating this decision that the plaintiff's attorney, Mr. 
Oliver, has filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the defendant's 
Summary Judgment Motion. The opposition was filed August 5, 2004, 
it was postdated and mailed to defendant's counsel August 2, 2004. 
The Memorandum is substantially out of time under Rule 7, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. There is nothing in the file requesting 
an extension of time to file an opposition Memorandum or anything 
else suggesting a late filing should be allowed or considered. The 
Request for Decision was filed July 21, 2004, and the Court 
reviewed the matter for decision before August 2, 2004. There 
being no basis to consider Mr. Oliver's out of time Memorandum, the 
Court declines to do so. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this day of August, 
2004: 
D. Bruce Oliver 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
David L. Church 
Attorney for Defendants 
5995 S. Redwood Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
